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Using data from 3,638 Spanish firms between 1996 and 2000, this article studies the relation-
ship between the presence of large shareholders in the ownership structure of firms and R&D
investment. Consistent with our theoretical contention, our results indicate that the impact of
large shareholders on the R&D investment is (1) negative when blockholders are banks, (2)
positive when blockholders are non-financial corporations and (3) null when blockholders are
individuals. In addition, we find a systematic negative relationship between the number of
blockholders and R&D investment. Finally, we extend our study by analysing the influence
that the combined effect between blockholder type and R&D investment has on the firm’s
economic performance. Results of this work provide relevant implications for policy makers
and academic research.
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Introduction
T he ownership structure of firms is recog-nised as an important determinant of its
general investment policy and, in particular, of
its research and development (R&D) spending
(Lee and O’Neil, 2003; Porter, 1990). However,
there is no consensus regarding the effect of
ownership concentration on a firm’s R&D
investment. To date, literature surrounding
this relationship has only provided mixed
results. While some studies showed a positive
relationship between large shareholders and
R&D investment (Hosono et al., 2004; Wahal
and McConnell, 2000), others found negative
(Yafeh and Yosha, 2003; Jones and Danbolt,
2003) or neutral associations (Francis and
Smith, 1995; Holderness and Sheehan, 1988).
In addition, previous studies have examined
this relationship in Anglo-American contexts
(Hoskisson et al., 2002; Porter, 1992, Tylecote
and Ramirez, 2006), and more recently some
comparative work with Japanese firms has
been conducted (Lee, 2005; Lee and O’Neil,
2003), but very little is known about these rela-
tionships in continental Europe.1
The aim of this paper is to reconcile these
conflicting results by enriching the analysis
of the firm’s ownership structure using the
Spanish case. The Spanish corporate system
has several institutional characteristics that
make it suitable in explaining the influence of
blockholders on R&D investments and distin-
guishes it from those considered in previous
research. We move a step further from the
simple characterisation of the stake of the main
blockholders as the main determinant of a
firm’s investment policy to incorporate two
features: (1) the type of blockholders and (2)
the number of blockholders necessary to
control a firm. Previous research rested on the
assumption that shareholders have homo-
genous preferences for R&D strategies. Only
recently has the type of blockholder received
some attention (e.g. Kochhar and David, 1996;
Lee, 2005; Hoskisson et al., 2002). Extending
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this line of research, we explore three different
types of blockholders: banks, non-financial
corporations and individuals. By introducing
the type of blockholder as explicative element,
we can evaluate how differences in preferences
may influence firms’ R&D investment. More-
over, we consider the number of blockholders,
a variable that has been largely neglected in
previous studies, as an additional determinant
of corporate innovation strategies.
Using a comprehensive database, we col-
lected data during the period 1996–2000 on
3,638 Spanish companies to test our conten-
tion. We found that banks, which are more
conservative investors and characterised by
debt holdings in firms, influence negatively
R&D expenses, while non-financial blockhold-
ers are more willing to promote innovative
endeavours as there might be beneficial syner-
gies for them. Concerning individual block-
holders, we observed a neutral impact on R&D
investments, since two countervailing effects
are at work. On the one hand, individual
blockholders are likely to exhibit stringent
monitoring and prevent opportunistic actions
since their stake represents a significant part
of their wealth, and thus are more likely to
engage in complex R&D activities. On the
other hand, the wide heterogeneity among
individual blockholders may hinder agree-
ments on R&D decisions, affecting innovative
initiatives. Furthermore, we found that as the
number of blockholder increases, a disagree-
ment effect hinders concurrence among
blockholders which negatively affects R&D
initiatives. Finally, we suggest that R&D
investment in the presence of corporate
ownership has a larger effect on performance
than when banks or individuals are the
blockholders.
Institutional characteristics of
the Spanish corporate
governance system
Previous studies using Spanish R&D data have
mainly focused on the effect of internal factors
on a firm’s innovative behaviour (e.g. Galende
and de la Fuente, 2003; Galende and Suarez-
Gonzalez, 1999), but the impact of the owner-
ship structure on R&D activities has been
largely ignored. To the best of our knowledge,
there are two exceptions. One is the work by
Ortega-Argiles et al. (2005), who considered
ownership concentration and the rate of
owners in management positions when ana-
lysing firms’ innovation activities. The other
exception is the work by Beneito (2003), who
controlled for the presence of a unique owner
in her model of R&D expenditures. Neither of
these studies, however, considered the pres-
ence of different types of large shareholders
and the number of blockholders as we do in
our study.
The Spanish context is particularly well
suited for our study for two reasons. First,
given that our goal is to investigate the distinct
effects on R&D of different types of block-
holders, we needed a context where large
blockholders were not only present but also
influential in the strategic decision process of
firms. These large blockholders may be insti-
tutional blockholders – defined as those large
entity investors from non-financial institutions
(corporations) to financial institutions, such as
a banks, insurance funds, retirement funds,
mutual funds – or non-institutional, like indi-
viduals. Spanish firms are characterised by the
presence of different types of blockholders
(banks, corporations and individual block-
holders), which play a prominent role in the
firms’ ownership structure (Crespi-Cladera
and Garcia-Cestona, 2002) and, consequently,
participate actively in firms’ decisions. Second,
the Spanish case may enrich the debate on cor-
porate governance and R&D issues, which
mainly focuses on the dichotomy between
insider-dominated and outsider-dominated
systems (Lee, 2005). It is often contended (see
for example, Becht and Mayer, 2002) that the
outsider system corresponds to firms in the
US and UK, where ownership is dispersed
amongst a large number of outside investors
(Leech and Manjon, 2002; Miozzo and Dewick,
2002; Tylecote and Ramirez, 2006), and when
institutional blockholders appear they tend to
be pension and mutual funds (Aguilera, 2004;
AQR, 2005). In contrast, Continental Europe
and East Asian countries are related to the
insider systems, where firms have high levels
of ownership concentration, even when they
are listed on stock markets. The Spanish
corporate governance system situates in an
intermediate position between insider- and
outsider-dominated systems (Aguilera, 2004;
AQR, 2005), and thus sheds new light on this
debate.
Three institutional characteristics of the
Spanish corporate governance system support
the foregoing statements and account for the
presence of different types of blockholders
and their relevance in explaining R&D invest-
ments: First, capital markets are considered
somewhat underdeveloped in Spain. For
instance, the stock market capitalisation as a
percentage of GDP in 1997 for Spain was 54.6,
significantly lower than for the US (144) or the
UK (155), but it is superior to Germany (39)
and France (49) (Megginson, 2000). Yet, the
number of listed companies is small and
accounts for only 0.5 per cent of companies.
This explains the emergence of institutional
blockholders, especially banks and other
financial institutions, as alternative control
mechanism. In most Spanish firms, certain
capital-intensive decisions like R&D rely
mainly on the controlling blockholder rather
than on the presence of financial markets. This
facilitates the identification of differential
effects on R&D investments related to the
presence of different blockholders.
The second characteristic of the Spanish cor-
porate governance system is the low investors’
protection in comparison with US, UK, Japan
and Germany (La Porta et al., 1998). This weak
investor protection has consequences in terms
of expropriation as the level of expropriation is
greater when the legal protection of share-
holders and creditors is low (La Porta et al.,
1999). Thus, the inadequate investor protection
explains the existence of large concentrated
ownership structures.
Last, the Spanish corporate system is char-
acterised by much more concentrated owner-
ship structure than in Anglo-Saxon countries,
but it is lower than several European coun-
tries. For instance, Barca and Becht (2002)
showed that average Spanish stockholding
was 15 per cent for domestic firms, 11 per
cent for individuals (including families), and
almost 7 per cent for banks versus the hold-
ings in UK, which were 5 per cent, 1.6 per cent
and 1.8 per cent, respectively. This superior
concentration makes investors more likely
to participate actively in firms’ decisions
(AQR, 2005), which favours the contrast of dif-
ferential effects of blockholders on R&D
investments.
Table 1 summarises other characteristics of
the Spanish corporate system. Its intermediate
position confers particular interest in the
conclusions derived from our study, given
the expected convergence between insider-
dominated and outsider-dominated systems
(Rajan and Zingales, 2003).
Theoretical framework
and hypotheses
The separation of ownership and control in
modern corporations jointly with the existence
of information asymmetries within the firm,
spawn the possibility of opportunistic actions
by the risk-averse agent – the manager – who
may have different objectives from a risk
neutral principal – the owner – and thus
pursue self-serving priorities, giving birth to
the so-called agency problems (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976). Three main traits make these
problems particularly severe in R&D invest-
ment decisions (Baysinger et al., 1991; Lee,
2005; Tihanyi et al., 2003). First, even though a
firm’s capability to innovate is expected to gen-
erate greater profits (Hirschey, 1985; Jose et al.,
1986), R&D activities are inherently risky as
they provide greater variability of outcomes
and greater probability of failure despite the
best effort of managers (Baysinger et al., 1991).
Table 1: Characteristics of corporate governance systems
Insider-dominated
(Germany and Japan)
Outsider-dominated
(US and UK)
Spain
Type of control Insider shareholders Capital markets Insider shareholders
Growing importance
of capital markets
Ownership of debt and equity Concentrated Dispersed Concentrated
Investor orientation Control-orientated Portfolio-orientated Control-orientated
Dominant agency conflict Controlling vs minority
shareholders
Shareholders vs
management
Mixed
Role of hostile take-overs Very limited Important Very limited
Role of board of directors Distinction between managing
and supervisory functions
Competent control
mechanism
Board members manage
the company and also
supervise its activity
Legal origin German origin English origin French origin
Shareholder protection Medium (Japan)
Low (Germany)
High Low
Creditor protection Medium (Germany)
Low (Japan)
Low Low
Source: Barca and Becht (2002), and own elaboration.
Second, R&D activities require long-term in-
vestments that may have a negative impact on
more immediate performance (Hoskisson et
al., 1993). This is particularly troublesome for
liquidity-constrained firms (Devereux and
Schiantarelli, 1990; Schaller, 1993), or firms
with information asymmetries (Devereux and
Schiantarelli, 1990). Consequently, risk-averse
managers may be reluctant to invest in risky
R&D projects. Third, R&D activities generally
require high managerial autonomy (Hambrick
and Finkelstein, 1987) to be effective, since
managers face a wide range of complex stra-
tegic choices. But, at the same time, risk-averse
managers with great level of discretion may
use their power to pursue low-risk strategies,
avoiding R&D initiatives and damaging firms’
innovation output (Billings et al., 2004). Thus,
the information asymmetry derived from the
complexity of innovative endeavours com-
bined with the large managerial discretion
needed to guide these projects may be used by
risk-averse managers to pursue their self-
serving agenda at the expense of the share-
holders (agency costs). Agency theory predicts
that proper governance mechanisms, like own-
ership concentration, can reduce agency costs
and help to ensure an appropriate level of
R&D investment since they curtail managers’
propensity to pursue inefficient strategies
(Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Jensen and
Meckling, 1976). However, previous empiri-
cal studies offer contradictory results, prevent-
ing definitive conclusions. Our position, as
argued next, is that these equivocal results can
be explained by incorporating two features
of blockholders: the type and number of
blockholders.
The type of blockholder
Previous literature portrays conflicting results
regarding the link between large shareholders
and innovation expenditures. Some studies
(e.g. Wahal and McConnell, 2000; Hill and
Snell, 1988; Baysinger et al., 1991) found the
existence of a positive relationship between
the presence of institutional shareholders and
R&D investment. Conversely, Graves (1988)
found in a sample of computer firms that
the presence of institutional blockholders
damaged R&D investment. Moreover, Chung
et al. (2003) deduced that there is no effect on
R&D investment due to the existence of insti-
tutional holdings. Also, Francis and Smith
(1995) did not find significant differences
in R&D-to-sales ratio when comparing
management-controlled firms with externally-
controlled ones (with large and external
blockholders).2
A common characteristic of all these studies
is that they assumed that ownership constitu-
encies have identical preferences for corporate
strategies. Only recently, some studies have
acknowledged the implications that the iden-
tity of such stakeholders can have for firms.
Hoskisson et al. (2002) found significant differ-
ences between two types of institutional
owners (i.e. pension funds and professional
investment funds) and firm’s innovation strat-
egies. Similarly, we argue that each type of
institutional blockholder has a distinguishable
impact on the firm’s R&D strategy. Unlike
their work, however, we focus on three types
of blockholders which have recognised par-
ticularities and deserve attention, namely
banks, non-financial corporations and indi-
vidual blockholders.
Because R&D initiatives require large
investments, it is vital to analyse the role of
banks as they are often the main sources of
financial capital. This is particularly the case
for Spanish firms, which face a strong (and
sometimes intrusive) bank system and a
relatively small stock market (Aguilera, 2004).
Spanish firms are also characterised by
significant cross-shareholding and director-
interlocks between companies (Aguilera,
2004; AQR, 2005). Thus, the presence of
non-financial companies in the ownership
structures of firms deserves attention when
studying a pivotal decision for a firm’s growth
like R&D investments. Finally, as is often the
case in continental Europe, wealthy individ-
uals, who generally belong to the same family,
own significant portions of companies (Leech
and Manjon, 2002). Because a large part of
their wealth is at stake in an undiversified
investment, individual blockholders have dis-
tinct preferences and incentives which can
influence the innovation strategy of firms.
Previous empirical evidence suggests that
ownership by banks might be related to R&D
initiatives, but results are not conclusive. For
instance, while Kochhar and David (1996)
found that banks had no significant impact on
R&D outputs, Lee (2005) found a positive and
significant relationship. Gugler (2003) also
showed that bank-controlled firms exhibit low
pay out ratios, which are inversely related to
R&D investments. Contrary to these results,
we expect bank blockholders to have a nega-
tive impact on R&D investment for several
reasons. First, banks maintain business rela-
tionships with the firm in which they invest
beyond simple ownership, often in the form of
loans and credits (Kroszner and Strahan,
2001). This exposes banks, which are conserva-
tive institutions, to the uncertainty of R&D
investment returns through two channels:
credits and stakes. Second, the presence of
banks stimulates firms to raise capital through
debt financing (Petersen and Rajan, 1994). The
larger the amount of debt, the larger the riski-
ness of this debt and the more important the
distortions that this debt generates in a firm’s
investment decisions. One of this distortions
described in the literature is the short-term
investment bias (Grinblatt and Titman, 1998).
A firm tends to invest in short-term projects as
a way to reduce the burden of its debt. This
bias should hinder R&D investments, which
are mainly long-term oriented (Hoskisson
et al., 1993). Thus, we expect that when banks
are present in the ownership structure of
firms, their R&D related investments would
tend to be flattened.
Hypothesis 1: There is a negative influence of
a bank’s ownership on firm’s R&D investment
intensity.
The second type of institutional blockholder
that we identify is the non-financial corpora-
tion. We expect a positive influence of the pres-
ence of this blockholder on R&D investment
for different reasons:
First, compared to banks, non-financial cor-
porations rarely have credit relationships with
their controlled firms (Kroszner and Strahan,
2001; La Porta et al., 2003). This eliminates one
channel of uncertainty in R&D investments for
former corporations. Also, the non-existence of
these credit relationships reduces debt riski-
ness and prevents investment inefficiencies
like the aforementioned short-term invest-
ment bias which, in turn, would favour R&D
investments.
Second, non-financial corporations, unlike
banks, are more likely to recognise the rel-
evance of R&D investment as a pivotal input
for their market success. The existence of
reciprocal business relationships, potential
synergies and spillover effects between the
owner and the controlled firms should favour
R&D investment of the latter (Jaffe, 1986).
By investing in R&D, controlled firms can
improve their absorptive capacity (Cohen and
Levinthal, 1990), enhancing their ability to
learn from the corresponding R&D invest-
ments of the owner firms.
Last, in some occasions, owner companies
invest in R&D-intensive firms strategically
with the intention of delegating to these firms,
that are specialist in such activities, part of
their R&D investments. This allows efficient
investments and superior returns. This kind of
behaviour is observed in the venture capital
industry, where large corporations invest in
start-up firms and give these firms incentives
for investing in R&D-intensive projects. If
these start-up firms become successful, corpo-
rations integrate them in their own division as
a way of improving their own R&D invest-
ments (Gompers and Lerner, 2006). Thus,
Hypothesis 2: There is a positive influence of
non-financial corporation’s ownership on firm’s
R&D investment intensity.
The last type of blockholder that we identify
is the individual or non-institutional block-
holder. For this type of blockholder, we expect
an ambiguous relationship between its pres-
ence and the R&D investment intensity of the
controlled firm due to the existence of two
countervailing effects. Baysinger et al. (1991)
argued that the absence of a systematic rela-
tionship between ownership concentration
among individual shareholders and R&D
investment is due to the heterogeneity of indi-
vidual investors in terms of risk preference
and investment horizons. This heterogeneity
of individuals is translated into two opposite
effects.
On the one hand, monitoring is enhanced
when individual blockholders are present
because a set of different types of blockholders
with different points of view enriches vigi-
lance. At the same time, individual blockhold-
ers’ stakes represent a significant part of their
wealth and thus have an incentive to better
observe managers’ actions. This enhanced
monitoring is expected to favour the invest-
ment in complex R&D activities. On the
other hand, agreements on long-term R&D-
intensive projects are more difficult to achieve
when there is great heterogeneity among
blockholders (disagreement effect). That is, con-
flicting voices are likely to be present when
there is risk and investment horizons hetero-
geneity among owners (Hoskisson et al., 2002).
Thus,
Hypothesis 3: There is an ambiguous impact of
individual ownership on firm’s R&D invest-
ment intensity.
Number of blockholders
We focus on an additional dimension of own-
ership structure: the number of blockholders
that form a coalition to control the firm
(control group with a stake larger than 50 per
cent). We argue that ceteris paribus, increases in
the number of blockholders within control
group have an impact on R&D investment
policy. This is so because the existence of a set
of large shareholders with different individual
objectives makes more difficult to reach con-
sensus on firm decisions, especially in those
decisions that involve long-term agreements
like those to undertake R&D-intensive pro-
jects. This is the aforementioned disagreement
effect.
Moreover, the existence of a large number of
blockholders weakens the degree of monitor-
ing of manager’s actions since vigilant re-
sponsibilities are diluted among a greater
number of dominant shareholders. This, in
turn, enhances managerial discretion and
consequently managers have greater leeway
to pursue low-risk strategies and show self-
serving behaviour (Finkelstein and Boyd, 1998;
Tosi et al., 1997), evading risky R&D projects.
Thus, we hypothesise the existence of a nega-
tive relationship between the number of block-
holders and firm R&D investment policy.
Hypothesis 4: The number of blockholders has
a negative influence on firm’s R&D investment
intensity.
The impact of the combined effect
between blockholder type and R&D
expenditures on firm performance
The ultimate reason for investing in R&D is
to improve the firm’s performance. Conse-
quently, a reasonable extension is to analyse
whether ownership structure is exclusively a
determinant of R&D or it also plays an addi-
tional moderating role connecting R&D invest-
ments and performance. Le et al. (2006)
recognised the importance of the presence of
different institutional investors like pension
funds in moderating positively the impact of
R&D investments on performance.
We content that the impact of R&D expendi-
tures on performance is contingent to the type
of blockholder. We rely on the very basic argu-
ment that those blockholders that are keener
to stimulate R&D investment will have more
incentives to extract superior returns from
these investments in comparison with others
less interested in these investments. Specifi-
cally, given the above considerations concern-
ing different types of blockholders, we expect
corporate owners to be more efficient in
channelling R&D investment into productive
outcomes. They have more experience in
taking part of different R&D projects, either
in the same firm or in other companies. This
improves the skills of corporate owners
(learning-by-doing) in managing R&D-in-
tensive projects which should translate into
superior returns from these investments.
Unsurprisingly, these corporate blockholders
often decide to participate in certain firms with
the intention to develop part of their R&D
activities in such firms because they are more
flexible and efficient. Moreover, this outsourc-
ing puts pressure on the own division of the
corporate blockholder for increasing their
returns from R&D investments; otherwise,
there will be more delegation in favour of
the partially-owned firm. This logic explains
the corporate venture capital phenomenon
(Gompers and Lerner, 2006). Thus,
Hypothesis 5: There is a larger marginal
impact of R&D investments on performance
when corporations are blockholders compared
with other types of blockholders like banks or
individuals.
Methods
Sample and data
We use the SABE databases for the years 1996–
2000, which are available from Bureau Van Dijk
and provide the ownership structure, balance
sheets and income statements for over 190,000
Spanish firms (95 per cent of all Spanish com-
panies) that deposit their financial statements
in the Central Mercantile Register (Registro
Mercantil Central). We restrict the sample
using three criteria: we eliminate firms that do
not report the ownership structure, those that
do not present detailed financial statements
and those that are not corporations (coopera-
tives, partnerships and proprietorship). More-
over, these three criteria have to be satisfied
for at least three of the five available years.
The final sample is an unbalance panel of
3,638 different firms and 12,685 firm-year
observations.
Measures
Dependent variables
R&D intensity. The variable to characterise a
firm’s R&D policy is its R&D intensity that is
defined in terms of the ratio of R&D expendi-
tures to total sales.
Financial performance. We approach firm per-
formance through the Return on Assets (ROA)
defined as the ratio of earnings before interests
and taxes to the total value of assets. For the
sake of robustness, we also provide results
using the return on equity measure defined as
the ratio of profits to the equity book value.
Independent variables
Variables of ownership structure. The first
dimension of the ownership structure is the
type of blockholder. We distinguish between
banks, non-financial corporations and indi-
viduals. We define as Bank ownership the stake
in the hands of banks; Corporate ownership the
stake in the hands of other firms; and Indi-
vidual ownership the stake in the hands of indi-
viduals (non-institutional blockholders). Two
comments are in order. First, we consider dif-
ferent thresholds in the stake to define a block-
holder, ranging from 0 per cent to 20 per cent
(in the tables we show the results of the
extreme cases of no threshold and 20 per cent
threshold).3 Second, we follow Bennedsen and
Wolfenzon (2000) to define the number of
blockholders that form the controlling coali-
tion (Number controlling blockholders). When the
largest shareholder owns more than 50 per
cent of the shares, we assume that it is the only
member of the coalition. When the largest
shareholder owns less than 50 per cent, for
a given ownership structure many different
controlling coalitions may be formed. In a
rough simplification, we assume that in this
case the two largest shareholders will always
be in the coalition. If the joint stake of the two
largest shareholders is lower than 50 per cent,
then the coalition will also include the third
largest shareholder and so on.
To study crossed effects between the afore-
mentioned dimensions, we consider variables
Bank ownership ¥ Number that is the product of
Bank ownership times the Number controlling
blockholders. Following the same logic, we
define Corporate ownership ¥ Number and Indi-
vidual ownership ¥ Number.
In the performance specifications, we iden-
tify those firms with a value of R&D intensity
larger than the mean for the sector in the
corresponding year with a dummy variable
Dummy R&D. Also, we consider the interac-
tive effect of the ownership structure and
R&D investment on a firm performance. This
leads to define the following variables Bank
ownership ¥ Dummy R&D that is the product of
Bank ownership times the Dummy R&D vari-
able. Following the same logic, we define Cor-
porate ownership ¥ Dummy R&D, Individual
ownership ¥ Dummy R&D and Number control-
ling blockholders ¥ Dummy R&D.
Control variables
We control for size effects with the Sales vari-
able that is the amount of sales on a log scale.
We also control for the financial structure,
which is captured with two variables (Galende
and Suarez-Gonzalez, 1999). First, Debt-to-
equity, which is the ratio of book value of debt
to the book value of equity. Second, Internal
funds-to-assets, which is the ratio of a firm’s
internal funds to the overall value of a firm’s
assets. We control for performance through the
ROA variable (we lagged this variable one
period and named it ROA {t–1} to prevent
potential endogeneity problems). Also, in
order to capture the existence of some inertia
in R&D investment decisions, which are
mainly long-term, we include the dependent
variable of R&D intensity lagged by one
period R&D {t–1}. Additionally, we introduce
as control a variable family that is a dummy
that is equal to 1 when there are blockholders
that belong to the same family. Finally, we con-
trolled for sector and year by detracting from
the dependent variables its mean value by year
and 1-digit sector in the fixed-effect estima-
tion.4 For non fixed-effect estimations, we
introduce temporal and sectoral dummies.5
Data analysis and model specification
Our main specification is aimed to test the
effect of different types of blockholders as
well as its number on a firm’s R&D invest-
ment intensity. We focus on the following
specification:
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To test the effects on performance of differ-
ent combinations of blockholders and a firm’s
R&D investment, we used the following
specification:
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In both estimations, we recognise the pos-
sible existence of unobservable heterogeneity
ui, ′ui potentially correlated with a firm’s own-
ership structure and/or other independent
variables. We consider that there may be some
unobservable firm characteristics, like mana-
gerial skills, that may affect R&D policy
and/or firm’s performance and the same char-
acteristics also may attract a particular type of
blockholder. This may generate a correlation
between a firm’s intrinsic and unobservable
characteristics ui, ′ui and its type of block-
holder. We deal with this problem by making
use of fixed-effect techniques (within group
estimators).6
Results
Table 2 describes the main variables used in
our hypotheses testing. The average stake of
the largest blockholder is 68.97 per cent, indicat-
ing the large ownership concentration in
Spanish firms. Also, the stake in the hands of
banks is, on average, 30.79 per cent; 77.47 per
cent for other corporations and 67.14 per cent
for individuals.7 The number of blockholders
in the controlling coalition is significantly
lower for those firms that invest significantly
in R&D (dummy R&D = 1) in comparison with
those that do not, suggesting initial support for
Hypothesis 4. Finally, those firms that invest
intensively on R&D are more profitable, larger
and with family participation.
Table 3 shows the results of the presence of
different types of blockholders on a firm’s R&D
intensity. For robustness, in column 4, we
imposed a minimum threshold stake of 20 per
cent to define a blockholder. In the last column,
as an extension, we incorporated a new variable
(Large ¥ individual ownership) that is the product
of a dummy (Large), which is equal to 1 when an
individual stake is larger than 50 per cent, times
individual blockholder’s stake. This allows us
to study the expected null effect that individual
stake on R&D holds independently of whether
that stake is large or small.
When focused on the type of blockholder,
we find that banks’ ownership has a signifi-
cant negative impact on R&D investment;8 the
presence of corporate blockholders stimu-
lates this kind of investments, while non-
institutional blockholders (individuals) do
not have a significant impact. These results
conform to Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3, respectively.
Concerning the number of blockholders, all
specifications, except one, show a negative
impact on a firm’s R&D intensity. These results
are consistent with those obtained by Ortega-
Argiles et al. (2005). Overall, results suggest
that a disagreement effect exists and it hinders
R&D investments as predicted by Hypothesis
4. However, when considering a minimum
stake of 20 per cent (column 4), this variable is
not significant. A plausible explanation for this
result is that with the 20 per cent threshold
there are only a few blockholders because the
condition to be a blockholder is more demand-
ing. And, a larger number of blockholders is
needed to capture the negative impact (dis-
agreement effect) on R&D investment.
The interaction between the types of block-
holders and their number reveals that the
existence of a large number of blockholders
has a negative moderating effect when other
corporations have a controlling role in a firm.
Also, for individual blockholders, this moder-
ating effect of increases in the number of
blockholders is neutral regardless whether
the stake of individual blockholders is larger
(Large = 1) or lower than 50 per cent
(Large = 0).
Consistent with the findings by Galende
and Suarez-Gonzalez (1999), who used identi-
Table 2: Means and standard deviationsa
Mean St. Dev. R&D = 1a R&D = 0a T-test (p-value)
R&D intensity 0.006 0.058 0.046 0.001 0.000***
ROA 0.090 0.189 0.102 0.088 0.008***
Bank ownership 30.787% 33.559% 27.062% 31.657% 0.261
Corporate ownership 77.469% 29.741% 74.653% 81.403% 0.000***
Individual ownership 67.143% 37.868% 72.516% 57.523% 0.000***
Stake of the largest
blockholder
68.969% 31.359% 69.945% 68.839% 0.199
Number controlling
blockholders
1.279 0.723 1.229 1.285 0.004***
Sales 14.774 1.391 14.871 14.761 0.004***
Debt-to-equity 6.979 549.091 1.364 7.686 0.686
Internal funds-to-assets 0.377 0.317 0.364 0.379 0.077*
Family 0.148 0.356 0.068 0.150 0.000***
aWe define R&D = 1 (0), when R&D intensity is larger or equal (lower) than the mean for the sector (1-digit)
and year.
*p  0.10; **p  0.05; ***p  0.01.
cal variables to those of our specification and
also applied to Spanish data, we observe that
financial structure (debt-to-equity) do not have
a significant impact on R&D investment.
However, the literature establishes, in general,
a negative impact of leverage on R&D (Bah
and Dumontier, 2001; Carpenter and Petersen,
2002; Chiao, 2002; Hall, 1992).9 Unlike our
study, these papers do not include a full char-
acterisation of a firm’s ownership structure.
Table 3: Determinants of R&D investment intensity: full samplea
The dependent variable is the R&D intensity corrected by sector and year. In columns 1, 2, 3, 5, it is not imposed a minimum
threshold to define what a blockholder is, while in column 4 the threshold is 20%.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable R&D/sales R&D/sales R&D/sales R&D/sales R&D/sales
Bank ownership –0.0586***
(–4.8100)
–0.0710***
(–4.6500)
–0.0716***
(–2.5800)
–0.0712***
(–4.66)
Corporate ownership 0.0225***
(2.9900)
0.0786***
(4.5400)
0.1298***
(3.8000)
0.0859***
(4.67)
Individual ownership 0.0155
(1.0500)
–0.0156
(–0.3900)
–0.0089
(–0.1400)
–0.1304
(–0.84)
Large ¥ Individual ownership 0.1528
(0.95)
Bank ownership ¥ Number 0.0135
(1.2900)
0.0171
(0.7000)
0.0139
(1.33)
Corporate ownership ¥ Number –0.0587***
(–3.5800)
–0.1047***
(–3.1600)
–0.0665***
(–3.78)
Individual ownership ¥ Number 0.0350
(0.9900)
0.0290
(0.4700)
0.1058
(1.31)
Large x Individual ownership ¥ Number –0.1094
(–1.22)
Number controlling blockholders –0.0216***
(–2.6700)
–0.0238***
(–2.6300)
–0.0008
(–0.0900)
–0.0245***
(–2.70)
Family –0.0052
(–0.6700)
0.0018
(0.2500)
0.0093
(1.2500)
0.0083
(1.0600)
0.0109
(1.37)
ROA {t–1}b 0.0027
(0.5100)
0.0017
(0.3100)
0.0009
(0.1600)
0.0012
(0.2100)
0.0008
(0.15)
R&D {t–1}c 0.1280***
(8.6200)
0.1152***
(7.5900)
0.1099***
(7.2200)
0.1155***
(7.6100)
0.1098***
(7.21)
Sales –0.0029
(–0.6800)
–0.0025
(–0.6100)
–0.0024
(–0.5700)
–0.0028
(–0.6700)
–0.0024
(–0.58)
Debt-to-equity 0.0001
(0.0300)
0.0001
(0.0200)
0.0001
(0.0200)
0.0001
(0.0200)
0.0001
(0.02)
Internal funds-to-assets 0.0115
(1.2300)
0.0117
(1.2300)
0.0104
(1.0900)
0.0109
(1.1400)
0.0105
(1.10)
Intercept 0.0057
(0.9700)
–0.0046
(–1.2800)
–0.0035
(–0.9500)
–0.0033
(–0.8800)
–0.0037
(–1.02)
Hausman Test 4421.39
(0.0000)
4032.49
(0.0000)
4049.48
(0.0000)
4421.39
(0.0000)
4048.92
(0.0000)
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Fixed
effects
Fitness test 20.97
(0.0000)
10.25
(0.0000)
9.09
(0.0000)
7.98
(0.0000)
7.98***
Adjusted R2 32.27% 51.41% 46.39% 58.70% 46.16
Number of observations 8110 8110 8110 8110 8110
aStandardised regression coefficients are shown in the table. *p  0.10 **p  0.05 ***p  0.01.
bROA {t–1} means ROA lagged by one period. We have lagged this variable to avoid potential endogeneity problems.
cR&D {t–1} means R&D intensity lagged by one period.
Hence, differences may be explained by the
effect of ownership structure that outweighs
those of financial structure. To investigate this
issue more in-depth, we have decomposed (in
an unreported specification available upon
request) the variables of financial structure
into two variables: the first was the long-term
debt to asset ratio and the second was the
short-term debt to assets ratio. We found that
the null impact of the variable of financial
structure is due to the aggregation of two
effects. The positive effect on R&D due to the
long-term debt and a non-significant effect
connected to short-term debt. Remarkably,
these results hold regardless whether we
include variables of ownership structure or
not. Hence, the length of the financial structure
is what is relevant in determining R&D invest-
ment. This is not surprising given that R&D
investments are mainly long-term (Hoskisson
et al., 1993) and there should be a positive
linkage between the length of the investments
and that of the financial instruments (Von
Thadden, 1995). Finally, concerning the inter-
nal funds, the non-significant result is also
consistent with Galende and Suarez-Gonzalez
(1999). Other studies found a positive impact.
However, the linkage between investment and
internal funds is mainly found in liquidity-
constrained firms (Devereux and Schiantarelli,
1990; Schaller, 1993) or firms that suffer agency
costs (Devereux and Schiantarelli, 1990).10
Remarkably, in our sample only 2.57 per cent
of the firms suffer liquidity constraints accord-
ing to a measure developed by Asquith et al.
(1994).11
Finally, we analyse the moderating effect of
ownership structure on the impact of signifi-
cant R&D investments on performance (see
Table 4). We find that this is positive and sig-
nificant, but only when non-financial firms
are the largest blockholders. This result holds
regardless the financial measure used (ROA or
ROE) and independently of the threshold used
to define a blockholder (20 per cent or 0 per
cent). This provides robust support to Hypoth-
esis 5. Also, we have found that there no dif-
ference in moderating effect of individual
ownership stake contingent on their stake once
we analyse the connection between R&D
investments and performance. This is consist-
ent with what we have found analysing the
determinants of R&D.
Discussion and conclusion
Decisions regarding the magnitude and allo-
cation of R&D expenditures are extremely
important for corporations, and it is crucial to
identify the configurations that foster innova-
tion activities. Thus, this study is important
for both investors and public authorities, as
it helps identifying idiosyncratic ownership
structures that favour R&D investment.
The type of blockholders
Large shareholders play a decisive role in criti-
cal corporate decisions (Tirole, 2001). These
blockholders have the incentives and the
power to influence management’s discretion
with respect to R&D strategies. However,
previous literature has provided ambiguous
results concerning ownership concentrations
and R&D investments, and has generally
assumed that ownership constituencies have
identical preferences for innovation strategies.
This article offers an alternative perspective
that helps reconciling conflicting results found
in the literature.
Consistent with the ownership structure of
European firms, we have examined the effect
of three blockholders – banks, non-financial
corporations and individuals – and found that
bank ownership is negatively related with
R&D investments, whereas non-financial cor-
poration ownership shows a positive impact
and individual ownership has a neutral effect.
We have drawn on the conservatism of
banks in their investment policy and in their
potential role as lenders of their partially-
owned firms to justify their negative impact
on a firm’s R&D investment. Also, we have
argued that banks entail a superior capacity to
raise debt which may generate inefficiencies
like the short-term investment bias which
damage R&D investments.
We have relied upon the knowledge accu-
mulated through their own R&D investment
track to justify the positive impact of non-
financial corporations on R&D investment of
controlled firms. Owner firms have incentives
to influence managerial decisions towards
R&D projects developed within their con-
trolled firms, as they can take advantage of
future spillovers.
The neutral effect of individual ownership
that we have found is consistent with the
evidence found by Baysinger et al. (1991).
This is explained by the characteristics of this
group: they have more powerful incentives
to scrutinise managerial decisions than institu-
tional blockholders (i.e. banks and corpora-
tions) because individual blockholders’ stakes
represent a significant part of their wealth,
but at the same time, the high heterogeneity of
these blockholders complicate the agreement
on what investments should be made (dis-
agreement effect). This damages a firm’s R&D
investments.
The number of blockholders
We have also found empirical support for our
expectation of a negative impact of the number
of blockholders on a firm’s R&D. A set of large
shareholders with different preferences set
hurdles in agreements about firm decisions,
depressing R&D investments.
This result is somewhat in line with the
notion of managerial discretion (Finkelstein
Table 4: Performance analyses by the type of blockholdera
The dependent variable is the Return on assets (ROA) for columns 1, 2 and 3; while it is the return on equity for the other
columns. Also, in columns 1, 2, 4, it is not imposed a minimum threshold to define a blockholder, while in columns 3 and
5, the threshold is 20%.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable ROA ROA ROA (20%) ROE ROE (20%)
Bank ownership –0.0024
(–0.1600)
–0.003
(–0.170)
0.002
(0.120)
–0.002
(–1.430)
–0.002
(–1.290)
Corporate ownership 0.0576**
(2.3200)
0.058***
(2.340)
0.060***
(2.520)
0.002**
(1.860)
0.006***
(2.550)
Individual ownership 0.0753***
(3.3400)
0.021
(0.290)
0.024
(0.260)
–0.003
(–0.450)
0.003
(0.250)
Large ¥ Individual ownership 0.057
(0.790)
0.054
(0.610)
0.001
(0.090)
–0.003
(–0.260)
Number controlling blockholders –0.0160
(–1.3800)
–0.016
(–1.350)
0.017
(1.390)
0.000
(–0.210)
–0.001
(–0.750)
Bank ownership ¥ Dummy R&D 0.0076
(0.7300)
0.008
(0.740)
0.006
(0.540)
0.001
(1.440)
0.001
(1.270)
Corporate ownership ¥ Dummy R&D 0.0586***
(3.2600)
0.058***
(3.200)
0.063***
(3.520)
0.007***
(3.530)
0.006***
(3.360)
Individual ownership ¥ Dummy R&D 0.0060
(0.2900)
0.078
(0.860)
0.060
(0.600)
–0.018
(–1.120)
0.003
(0.230)
Large x Individual ownership ¥ Dummy R&D –0.074
(–0.820)
–0.056
(–0.550)
0.020
(1.270)
–0.000
(–0.020)
Number controlling blockholders ¥ Dummy
R&D
–0.0137
(–0.7900)
–0.014
(–0.810)
–0.023
(–1.030)
–0.001
(–0.500)
0.000
(0.250)
Dummy R&D –0.0092
(–0.4400)
–0.009
(–0.440)
0.000
(–0.010)
–0.003***
(–2.490)
–0.004***
(–2.640)
Family 0.0276**
(2.2800)
0.028***
(2.250)
0.035***
(2.850)
0.000
(0.140)
0.002*
(1.78)
Sales 0.0580***
(7.2300)
0.058***
(7.230)
0.058***
(7.290)
0.002***
(3.320)
0.001***
(2.890)
Debt-to-equity 0.0009
(0.1600)
0.001
(0.160)
0.001
(0.160)
–0.232
(–9.280)
–0.232
(–9.290)
Internal funds-to-assets 0.4346***
(35.4600)
0.435***
(35.470)
0.434***
(35.470)
0.017***
(11.390)
0.016***
(11.110)
Intercept 0.0027
(0.1500)
0.003
(0.140)
0.002
(0.130)
–0.007***
(–20.500)
–0.007***
(–20.340)
Hausman Test 31.48
(0.2518)
31.49
(0.3425)
38.02
(0.1219)
136.70
(0.0000)
138.19
(0.0000)
Fixed effects No No No Yes Yes
Fitness Test 1390.46
(0.0000)
1391.08
(0.0000)
1455.28
(0.0000)
12.88
(0.0000)
11.70
(0.0000)
Adjusted R2 15.00% 15.00% 16.30% 3.93% 3.98%
Number of observations 12444 12444 12444 12069 12069
aStandardised regression coefficients are shown in the table. The estimations include temporal and sectoral dummy variables when they
are not fixed.
p  0.10; **p  0.05; ***p  0.01.
and Boyd, 1998). As the stock ownership is
more disperse, managerial discretion increases
and risk-averse managers would allocate re-
sources away from risky projects. This suggests
that investors should invest with caution in
firms with a high number of blockholders,
especially if the company belongs to a high-
tech sector, where innovation is vital for
organisational survival.
Performance analysis
The previous discussion raises a natural
question: Does the control device of large
shareholders lead to appropriate investment
decisions? Our results suggested that when
firms engage in conspicuous R&D projects (i.e.
R&D investments higher than the mean of the
sector), the presence of non-financial corpora-
tions as large shareholders has a positive
impact on financial performance. This result is
an illustration of the positive influence of cor-
porations, which are expected to have their
own experience in managing R&D invest-
ments, in leading their partially-owned firms
to choose those projects that improve financial
performance.
Policy implications
In the past decades governments worldwide
set out privatisation programmes of state-
owned firms. In some cases, like the Czech
Republic, the ownership structure of firms that
emerged after privatisation was much diluted.
Our results indicate that this dilution (an
increase in the number of blockholders) may
be prejudicial, as it has a negative impact on
the R&D investments. Second, in countries like
Spain, the government promoted after the
privatisation programme (particularly from
1996 to 2003), the creation of stable investors
(“núcleos duros”) that were mainly composed
of banks. We have shown that this may have
a perverse effect in the R&D policies foll-
owed by the recently-privatised firms, which
may damage their growth perspectives. Last,
governmental agencies that allocate funds
to stimulate firms’ R&D investment should
take into consideration the relevant role that
ownership structure plays in promoting such
investments and also in moderating their
impact on performance. As a rule of thumb,
these agencies should give priority to those
firms included by other firms in their owner-
ship structure as significant blockholders.
Future research
Future research could study the extent to
which R&D investments may be used as a
mechanism of earnings management by con-
trolling blockholders. It could be argued that
by investing in R&D, firms may channel
more easily accounting expenses and smooth
income. Given this, an institutional block-
holder with a controlling stake in R&D-
intensive firms may stimulate these practices
to consolidate this income-smoothing policy in
their own balance sheet. A second avenue
refers to the analysis of other types of institu-
tional investors (e.g. mutual and pension
funds) that are less common in the Spanish
context. Also, the use of alternative measures
of corporate governance and financial perfor-
mance (e.g. market-based measures), to which
we did not have access, would allow a more
finely grained analysis to validate our results.
In addition, ownership structure is only one
mechanism that may influence R&D invest-
ment, but others like composition of the board
or CEO duality may be of interest for future
research.
Notes
1. An exception is the work by Gugler (2003) that
uses Austrian data and distinguishes between
state-controlled, family-controlled, bank-con-
trolled and foreign-controlled firms. He found
that for state-controlled firms the pay-out ratio
is larger than for foreign-controlled which in
turn are larger than bank-controlled, being the
firms with the lowest pay-out ratio family firms.
This author connects inversely pay-out ratios to
R&D investments.
2. Other studies look at different aspects of own-
ership structure, like foreign ownership, and
find a positive connection between this latter
variable and R&D investment (Love et al.,
1996).
3. Note that the 10 per cent threshold proposed by
La Porta et al. (1999) is included in our range.
Moreover, the results using a 10 per cent
threshold are consistent with those shown in
the paper (no threshold or 20 per cent thresh-
old).
4. We use a classification of sectors (CNAE) that
has a correspondence with more standard SIC
codes (available upon request).
5. We had to rule out sectoral and temporal
dummies in the fixed-effect estimation because
these variables would have been dropped out.
6. The way to inspect whether there is correlation
or not is through the Hausman test that studies
whether those coefficients of the fixed-effect
estimation are equal to those of the random-
effects estimations. If this null hypothesis is
rejected, the only consistent estimator is the
fixed-effects one. If not, the best alternative is to
use the random-effect estimation. Additionally,
in unreported estimations, we allowed for the
possibility of a second endogeneity problem
not linked to the unobservable heterogeneity,
but to the error component. This may perfectly
be the case as we incorporate in the specifica-
tion of R&D intensity the dependent variable
lagged by one period as a way to capture the
persistence of R&D investment decisions. We
addressed this second endogeneity problem
making use of GMM techniques (available
upon request). However, results barely change
from those provided in Table 3. Hence, the
main source of endogeneity is the unobservable
heterogeneity that has been eliminated through
fixed-effect estimations.
7. It is remarkable that we obtain a positive
impact on R&D investment only for the pres-
ence of corporations, which have, on average, a
larger stake. Hence, it seems that the larger the
stake of blockholders, the larger the incentives
for investing in R&D.
8. It may be the case that blockholders’ banks are
also lenders (Kroszner and Strahan, 2001) and
the negative impact of banks’ stake relies on
increases in the cost of capital of bank credits.
To eliminate such possibility, we have
re-estimated the specifications (available upon
request) replacing the overall debt by short-
term bank debt. The results show that bank
debt has a null effect on R&D investment while
the negative coefficient of “banksown” still
holds. That is, when we extract from banks’
stake the effect of the lending channel – by
including a variable of bank debt – there is still
a negative impact of banks’ stake on R&D. We
thank an anonymous referee for this comment.
9. One of the seminal papers that captured this
relationship in the US was the work by Hall
(1992). This relationship was later confirmed by
Chiao (2002), who found equivalent results even
after separating R&D investment from physical
investment. Bah and Dumontier (2001) obtained
similar results using an international database.
Finally, Carpenter and Petersen (2002) found
that small high-tech firms prefer equity financ-
ing than debt financing and, once they are listed
on the stock market, internal financing is the
best alternative.
10. Consistent with Devereux and Schiantarelli
(1990), once we focus on growth firms – whose
increase in the sales rate is larger than the mean
of the corresponding sector – we have found
that the variable of internal funds has a positive
effect on R&D investments, while long-term
debt has a negative one. Note that in these firms
problems of information asymmetries and
liquidity needs are particularly acute.
11. A firm is in financial distress when the interest
coverage ratio – defined as the ratio of earnings
before interest, taxes and amortisation to the
reported interest expenses – falls from a value
more than or equal to 2, to a value less than or
equal to 1 in the next period.
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